Introduction
As noted in the introduction, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is one of the most widely adopted theories used to study IT outsourcing (ITO) decisions. Early ITO articles argued that TCE is a useful framework for studying ITO decisions for various reasons (Clark et al., 1995; Cronk and Sharp, 1995; De Looff, 1995; Jurison, 1995; Klepper, 1993 Klepper, , 1995 Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a; Beath, 1987) . First, TCE specifically addresses sourcing decisions, that is, the decision to produce a good or service internally or purchase it externally. Second, TCE captures the widely-held perception that organizational members make sourcing decisions based upon an economic rationale and that outsourcing should reduce costs (Anthes, 1990 (Anthes, , 1991 Hamilton, 1989; Hammersmith, 1989; Kass, 1990; Kelleher, 1990; Krass, 1990; Morse, 1990; O'Leary, 1990; Oltman, 1990; Rochester and Douglas, 1990) . Third, many practitioners use "TCE-speak" to explain why outsourcing is predicted to reduce IT costs: IT is most efficiently provided by external vendors because it is a commodity service (translated into "TCE-speak" as a "nonspecific asset") (Ward, 1991; Ambrosio, 1991) . Fourth, TCE has enjoyed an abundance of empirical and theoretical academic attention in other organizational contexts (Anderson, 1994; Bowen and Jones, 1986; Griesinger, 1990; Hill, 1990; Hennart, 1991a Hennart, , 1991b Hesterly et al., 1990; Joskow, 1985; Lieberman, 1991; Malone, 1987; Malone et al., 1987; Pisano, 1990; Robins, 1987; Walker and Poppo, 1991) . More recent ITO studies have rigorously tested TCE propositions and frequently found mixed results (Miranda and Kim, 2006) . Most interestingly, mixed results occurred within studies in that certain TCE propositions were supported and others were not. For example Ang and Cummings (1997) found support for asset specificity as a determinant of outsourcing in the context of large banks but not small banks. How can these mixed results be explained?
In this chapter, we interpret 61 sourcing decisions made by 145 participants in 40 US and UK organizations from a transaction cost perspective.
We analyzed the success and failure of participants' sourcing decisions to determine whether they outsourced or insourced the "right" transaction types using the "right" contracts as predicted by TCE. A significant percentage of anomalies -87.5% -resulted from this analysis. We present two interpretations of these anomalies -one interpretation maintains the integrity of a TCE perspective, and an alternative interpretation challenges the applicability of TCE to the IT outsourcing context. These two interpretations serve as the thesis and antithesis of a Hegelian approach to inquiry. After presenting both positions, we propose two alternatives which may lead to a synthesis of the debate.
Transaction Cost Theory: Williamson's governance framework
TCE's major constructs as defined by Oliver Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1979 Williamson ( , 1981 Williamson ( , 1985 Williamson ( , 1991 Williamson ( and 1994 ) -costs, transaction type, threat of opportunism, uncertainty and information impactedness -are briefly explained below. Although TCE theorists have preceded (Coase, 1937) and succeeded Williamson (Pitelis, 1991) , he is widely recognized as the major author and spokesperson of TCE, as evidenced by over 40,000 citations of his work as of December 2007. Williamson's constructs were the foundation for our research.
Williamson developed Transaction Cost Economics when he became troubled by a discrepancy between economic theory and organizational reality. Economic theory predicts that goods and services are most efficiently produced in specialized organizations that are able to achieve economies of scale. Williamson questioned, however, why the twentieth century witnessed the growth of large bureaucracies that produce many goods and services internally (Perrow, 1986) . Williamson proposes that costs are comprised of not only production costs -the costs of capital, labor and materials -but transaction costs. Transaction costs, which are synonymous with coordination costs, consist of the costs of monitoring, controlling and managing transactions. Thus, managers consider total costs (production costs plus transaction costs) when selecting among sourcing alternatives.
In general, Williamson argues that production costs are lower with outsourcing due to vendor economies of scale achieved through mass production efficiencies and labor specialization. In general, however, Williamson argues that transaction costs are lower with insourcing because internal organizations presumably administer an efficient system of rewards and punishments to discourage employee opportunism. In contrast, organizations must incur transaction costs during contract negotiations/monitoring to prevent vendor opportunism.
In practice, production and transaction costs are often difficult to assess. Williamson, however, provides a heuristic for estimating costs based on the inherent nature of the transaction type which favors insourcing or out-
